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Why Do We Need to Employ Bayesian Statistics and How Can We Employ it in Studies of 
Moral Education?: With Practical Guidelines to Use JASP for Educators and Researchers 
Abstract 
In this paper, we discuss the benefits of and how to utilize Bayesian statistics in studies of 
moral education. To demonstrate concrete examples of the applications of Bayesian statistics to 
studies of moral education, we reanalyzed two datasets previously collected: one small dataset 
collected from a moral educational intervention experiment, and one big dataset from a large-
scale Defining Issues Test-2 survey. Results suggest that Bayesian analysis of datasets collected 
from moral educational studies can provide additional useful statistical information, particularly 
that associated with the strength of evidence supporting alternative hypotheses, which has not 
been provided by the classical frequentist approach focusing on P-values. Finally, we introduce 
several practical guidelines pertaining to how to utilize Bayesian statistics, including the 
utilization of newly developed free statistical software, Jeffrey’s Amazing Statistics Program 
(JASP), and thresholding based on Bayes Factors, to scholars in the field of moral education.  
Keywords: Bayesian statistics, Bayes Factor, P-values, Statistical analysis, JASP 
Introduction 
The Journal of Moral Education (JME) aims to introduce cutting-edge interdisciplinary 
studies contributing to the improvement of moral education (Kristjánsson, 2017). In order to 
achieve the aforementioned purpose, it is important to facilitate vigorous interactions between 
diverse fields contributing to moral education, including but not limited to moral philosophy, 
moral psychology, and moral education (Han, 2014; Jeong & Han, 2013). Particularly, 
developing effective educational programs and activities for moral education promoting moral 
development and positive youth development can be realized by constructing morally-valid 
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conceptual foundations based on moral philosophy and designing concrete activity components 
based on scientific evidence collected in the field of moral psychology (Han, 2014).  
Hence, we, researchers and educators in moral education, should pay keen attention to 
how to gather and test evidence supporting empirical aspects of moral education. Because 
educational activities, even those conducted during a very short period, can alter the 
developmental trajectories of students, such as the longitudinal changes in their academic 
achievement and well-being, significantly for the long term (Yeager & Walton, 2011), we need 
to be careful while trying to apply findings from empirical research to educational practice. Thus, 
we need to employ reliable and valid methodologies to analyze data for moral education (Han, 
Lee, & Soylu, 2016); it would be particularly important in the field of moral education, because 
moral education can significantly influence students’ behavior in social and civic contexts and 
well-being (Althof & Berkowitz, 2006; Han, 2015; Kristjánsson, 2013).  
Although recent debates about the frequentist perspective in the field of quantitative 
methods have intensified concerns regarding how to collect and test data properly (Benjamin et 
al., 2018), the majority of studies in the fields related to moral education have tend to use such a 
perspective. We have been used to employing the methodology of frequentist, such as P-values, 
in empirical studies of moral education. For instance, when we searched for articles published in 
the JME using a keyword, “Bayesian,” which has been considered to be able to address 
limitations of the frequentist approach, only four items were foundi. In fact, none of them 
actually used Bayesian inference in addition to or in place of classical frequentist inference; 
instead, three of them utilized Bayesian Information Criteria for model selection (Aho, 
Derryberry, & Peterson, 2014), and one merely cited another previous study using Bayesian 
approach. Furthermore, we searched for more peer-reviewed articles related to this topic from 
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the PsycInfo, the database of psychological articles organized by the American Psychological 
Association (APA). We used two keyword sets, “Bayesian” AND “Moral Education,” and 
“Bayesian” AND “Moral Development,” to search for previous articles relevant to the topics of 
the JME. When we entered the first keyword set, “Bayesian” AND “Moral Education,” we found 
only one article published so far ii.When we used the second keyword set, “Bayesian” AND 
“Moral Development,” the PsychInfo returned four peer-reviewed articles iii.  
Among the aforementioned five articles extracted from the PsycInfo, two articles 
authored by Walker, Gustafson and Hennig (2001), and Walker, Gustafson, and Frimer (2007) 
provide useful insights about how Bayesian approach can contribute to our field, moral 
development in particular. Walker et al. (2001) employed Bayesian analysis to examine how 
developmental data was classified, because classical frequentist methods were not appropriate 
for this purpose as classifying developmental data is based on probabilistic assumptions. Their 
study demonstrated that Bayesian analysis can help us better analyze probabilistic developmental 
classifications that could not be feasibly done with frequentist methods. Moreover, Walker et 
al.’s (2007) review article described benefits of Bayesian analysis in developmental 
psychological studies. They suggested that first, the interpretation of results from Bayesian 
analysis is more intuitive than that of p-values; second, it is easier to address missing data and 
measurement error issues with Bayesian techniques; third, Bayesian techniques can be feasibly 
employed to analyze hierarchical models associated with unobserved or latent structures (Walker 
et al., 2007).  
Although these previous studies were able to demonstrate potential benefits of Bayesian 
analysis in studies of moral education and moral development with a concrete example (Walker 
et al., 2001) and give us a primer on it values (Walker et al., 2007), they could not provide 
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educators and researchers, who are unlikely to have sufficient statistical expertise, with practical 
guidelines about how to implement Bayesian analysis. For example, Kondo's (1990) previous 
Bayesian modeling of moral behavior used MPlus (Muthén & Muthén, 2011). Walker et al. 
(2007) suggested researchers use WinBugs (MRC Biostatistics Unit, 2018). Although the 
aforementioned statistical tools provide users with very powerful functionalities, users should 
have expertise in statistics and computer programs as they require text-based coding. Instead, 
many moral educators and researchers might be familiar with simple tools featured with 
graphical user interface, such as SPSS (IBM, 2018). In addition, the aforementioned articles did 
not show how to perform basic statistical tests, such as t-tests, ANOVA, and correlation analysis, 
that many educators and researchers are interested in with Bayesian techniques.  
Thus, we intend to consider why we should employ Bayesian techniques in studies of 
moral education, and how to feasibly utilize such techniques. In fact, we, researchers and 
educators in the field of moral education have rely heavily on the frequentist approach, which is 
currently being criticized by quantitative methodologists, but have not paid much attention to 
alternative statistical methods, particularly Bayesian methods, that can address the limitations of 
the approach. In addition, although the aforementioned previous studies found from the PsycInfo 
have employed Bayesian statistics and contributed to the methodological improvements in the 
field, they could not provide concrete and feasible guidelines that can be easily understood by 
educators and scholars who do not have expertise in statistics. Hence, we overview Bayesian 
analysis and its benefits, examine how such analysis works with concrete datasets, and propose 
feasible practical guidelines for educators and researchers.  
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A Brief Introduction to Bayesian Analysis 
To understand what Bayesian analysis is, it would be helpful to contrast it to the 
mainstream, traditional statistical approach: frequentist statistics. The fundamental difference 
between frequentist and Bayesian schools of statistics comes from the different ways they view 
quantities of interest or parameters. Frequentists view parameters such as population mean or 
variance as ‘fixed but unknown constants’ (Neyman, 1977); the notion of randomness does not 
apply to the parameters themselves. In other words, parameters cannot be considered random. 
For example, when a researcher constructs a 95% confidence interval about the population mean, 
she is not saying, in principle, that the true mean is contained in the specific interval she 
constructed with a probability of 95%. This is prohibited in the frequentist school because we 
cannot give a probabilistic interpretation to a single event, i.e., a single confidence interval. 
Instead, ‘95%’ is a quality of the confidence-interval-construction-procedure itself in that, when 
constructed repeatedly under repeated experimentation, 95% of such intervals constructed would 
contain the true mean. Since we cannot make direct probabilistic statements about the parameters, 
it is difficult to express our uncertainty or degree of belief (or doubt) directly about them. 
On the other hand, Bayesians allow for expressing randomness about parameters 
themselves. That is, they regard parameters as random quantities or variables, not as fixed. It is 
possible to assume the probability distribution of a parameter of interest such as population 
means or differences among them. This allows researchers to express uncertainty about 
parameters in the form of probability distribution. The goal of Bayesian inferences is then to 
‘update’ the distribution in light of the data at hand. Bayes’ theorem is the universal 
mathematical tool for that purpose, which is formulated as 
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𝑃 𝜃 𝐷 = 𝑃 𝐷 𝜃 𝑃 𝜃𝑃 𝐷  
where θ denotes parameter(s). Description of each term is in order. For simplicity, we will 
assume that the parameter space is discrete for a moment. First, P(θ) is called the ‘prior 
probability’ and represents the probability that the parameter value is equal to θ before observing 
the data. And P(θ|D) is called ‘posterior probability’ which is the probability that the parameter 
value is 𝜃 after observing the data. In fact, the above formula can be understood as showing how 
prior is updated to be the posterior: posterior is prior times P(D|θ)/P(D) where P(D|θ) is called 
likelihood (the same concept as in frequentist statistics) and P(D) the marginal probability. 
Through applying Bayes’ theorem using the data at hand, which is known as Bayesian updating, 
one can update the probability that the parameter value is equal to each possible value of θ, 
yielding the posterior distribution of the parameter. The posterior distribution represents the 
updated probability (or degree of belief) about the parameter of interest after observing the data. 
In case of continuous parameters, probability masses are replaced by probability densities, but 
the general framework is not much different from the discrete case. 
Here is a basic example of how Bayesian inference works. Say we are interested in 
obtaining an interval estimate about a normal mean where we know the population variance. 
Given independent and identically distributed data, 𝑋',⋯ , 𝑋*~𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎0), where 𝜎0 is known, the 
traditional frequentist approach would yield a 95% confidence interval about 𝜇 as [𝑋 −𝑧.678 9* , 𝑋 + 𝑧.678 9*] where 𝑋 = '* 𝑋< is the sample mean and 𝑧.678 is the 97.5th percentile of 
the standard normal distribution. Note that this interval does not make a probabilistic statement 
directly about 𝜇. Indeed, introductory statistics textbooks warn against concluding that 𝜇 is in the 
constructed interval with a 95% probability.  
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How does a Bayesian approach differ from the frequentist one? First, Bayesian updating 
should be done. Here we will take the prior distribution for 𝜇 to be 𝑁(𝑚, 𝑠0). This reflects our 
prior belief or expectation that 𝜇 is close to 𝑚, and the degree of uncertainty is quantified by 𝑠0. 
These values should be chosen by the researcher in advance. There are many ways of doing this 
which we will not discuss in further detail here. Using the prior distribution and the data as 
described before, it can be shown that, by making use of Bayes’ theorem, the posterior 
distribution of 𝜇 is given by 𝑁(𝑚?, (𝑠)0) where 𝑚? = @AB@AB CDA 𝑚 + DA@AB CDA 𝑋 and 	(𝑠?)0 =
*9A + 'DA F' where 𝑚′ is called the posterior mean and (𝑠?)0 the posterior variance (Bolstad & 
Curran, 2016). These quantities reflect our modified belief about 𝜇 after observing the data. Note 
that the posterior variance, 	(𝑠?)0 = *9A + 'DA F', is smaller than the usual frequentist standard 
error, 9A* , which is due to the fact that we exploited the prior information about 𝜇. One can use the 
posterior distribution to construct an interval estimate for 𝜇, [𝑚? − 𝑧.678 DH* ,𝑚? + 𝑧.678 DH*] as in 
case of the frequentist approach. Bayesians typically refer to this type of interval estimates as 
credible intervals (Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963). The interpretation of credible intervals 
differ from that of confidence intervals because we are allowed to make direct probabilistic 
statements about 𝜇. For example, it is legitimate to say that the probability that 𝜇 lies in the 
constructed credible interval is equal to 0.95 because Bayesian interpretation of probability does 
not require the notion of repetition as frequentists do, and parameters are regarded as random 
variables. 
Bayesian analysis is believed to have the potential to address many problems associated 
with the (mis)uses of P-values in research (Wagenmakers, 2007). Discussions on this topic 
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abound, but we would like to briefly summarize the reason why Bayesian analysis is in the 
limelight recently. To begin with, here are specific problems of using P-values. First, P-values 
do not convey the information researchers would like to learn about, namely, the probability that 
a hypothesis is true given data, P(H|D) (Cohen, 1994; Wagenmakers, 2007). What P-values 
actually mean is, however, the inverse of that probability. That is, according to the definition of 
P-values, they are defined as the probability of observing data as extreme or more extreme than 
the one observed, P(D|H). This is not the same as P(H|D), as Bayes’ theorem tells us. Because 
the use of Bayes’ theorem itself does not hinge on whether one is frequentist or Bayesian, this 
criticism is not limited to the Bayesians’ perspectives. In addition, regarding this problem, 
misunderstandings about P-values are widespread (Gigerenzer, 2004), which exacerbates the 
problem.  
Second, P-values can be easily ‘hacked’ (Head, Holman, Lanfear, Kahn, & Jennions, 
2015; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). That is, researchers can engage in questionable 
research practices (QRPs; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012) to obtain ‘significant’ P-values 
that are less than .05, which is accepted widely by convention (Nelson, Simmons, & Simonsohn, 
2018). For example, if they observe a P-value which is slightly greater than .05, they could 
simply collect more data and conduct test again, and do this repeatedly until they reach P < .05. 
This practice is known as ‘optional stopping’ in the literature, and is thought to inflate Type 1 
error (Rouder, 2014). P-hacking is thought to impact the empirical distribution of P-values 
observed across the entire field, and there is evidence implying that it is actually happening 
(Simmons et al., 2011). 
Then, how does Bayesian analysis address those problems? First, Bayesian analysis 
provides researchers with a way to compute the quantity they are ultimately interested in, P(H|D), 
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the probability that some hypothesis is true given data at hand. Frequentists cannot define or 
compute this quantity since they are not allowed to assign probabilities of being true to 
hypotheses. Frequentists can assign a probability only to events from repeatable experiments, 
which is not the case for scientific hypotheses. Bayesians can do this, however, because a 
probability can be defined as ‘degree of belief’ about some event, which makes possible to 
assign a probability to a single event, which in the context of research is ‘the null/alternative 
hypothesis is true.’ So, they can talk about P(H) or P(H|D), the probabilities that a hypothesis is 
true before or after observing the data. 
Second, it is not yet clear how to ‘hack’ a Bayes Factor. At least, it comes with some 
forms of protection against P-hacking. First, researchers cannot simply increase sample sizes to 
obtain ‘significant’ results. In Bayesian hypothesis testing, interestingly, for a fixed value of P-
value, the support for a null increases, not decreases, as the sample size increases. The following 
table is taken from Berger and Sellke (1987). 
<Place Table 1 about here> 
We can see that, within a single row, P(H0|D) increases as sample size increases. For 
example, when P = .05, which is the gold standard researchers use in most behavioral research, 
one can see that P(H0|D) = .35 when n = 1, but it becomes .82 when n = 1,000. That is, the null is 
more likely to be true when n = 1,000 than n = 1. This seems to run against the common sense 
that, for a fixed effect size, statistical results become more ‘significant’ as n grows. It turns out 
that Bayesian hypothesis testing has a built-in inner structure that penalizes more complex 
hypothesis (models), and in this case the more ‘complex’ one was the alternative hypothesis 
because it says that the true parameter value can be anything but zero whereas the null that it 
must be exactly equal to zero. As a result, the same P-value obtained from a larger sample would 
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provide more support for the null than one from a smaller sample, and attempts to ‘hack’ Bayes 
Factors is not likely to be successful. 
In Bayesian analysis, Bayes Factors (BFs) are a popular tool to quantify evidence of the 
null against the alternative, or vice versa. A Bayes Factor is defined as follows: 
𝐵𝐹'K = 𝑃(𝐷|𝐻')𝑃(𝐷|𝐻K) = 𝑃 𝐻' 𝐷 /𝑃(𝐻')𝑃(𝐻K|𝐷)/𝑃(𝐻K) 
where 𝑃(𝐷|𝐻K) and 𝑃(𝐷|𝐻') are probabilities of observing data under the null, and the 
alternative, respectively. The expression above also tells us that a BF is also the ratio of the 
posterior odds, 𝑃 𝐷 𝐻' /𝑃(𝐷|𝐻K), to the prior odds, 𝑃(𝐻')/𝑃(𝐻K). That is, a BF is the factor 
by which the prior odds is multiplied to yield the posterior odds. Since prior odds and posterior 
odds are the ratio of beliefs about the hypotheses before and after observing the data, BFs can be 
thought of as quantifying how much one should adjust the prior belief give the data. Guidelines 
for interpreting BFs exist (Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995). 
Thanks to the advantages of conducting Bayesian analyses instead of traditional, 
frequentist analyses, discussions about them are burgeoning now. What is lacking from the 
academic discourses are how to actually conduct them in practice. As pointed out, only few 
articles mentioned and utilized Bayesian analysis. Although some of them, particularly Walker et 
al.’s (2001) study showed how Bayesian techniques can contribute to probabilistic 
developmental classifications with a concrete example, the lack of practical guidelines for end 
users in the previously published articles can be problematic to help the end users employ 
Bayesian analysis in their studies of moral education. This has to be addressed as well. 
Present Study 
We aim to introduce the perspective and methodology of Bayesian statistics to readers of 
the JME, researchers and educators in moral education, with concrete examples and practical 
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guidelines. Particularly, we intend to introduce a new tool implementing Bayesian inference, 
Jeffrey’s Amazing Statistics Program (JASP)iv, which has a feasible user interface (Love et al., 
2017), can be utilized conveniently for studies of empirical psychology (Marsman & 
Wagenmakers, 2017; Wagenmakers, Love, et al., 2017). Also, we plan to focus on basic 
statistical methods that have been frequently utilized by moral educators and researchers (e.g., t-
test and ANOVA, correlation analysis), but have not been well introduced in the previous 
published articles pertaining to Bayesian analysis and moral educational studies. First, we will 
compare outcomes from the classical (frequentist) and Bayesian analyses of data collected from 
the previous psychological studies of moral education. Second, we will discuss some Bayesian 
benefits and practical guidelines about how to perform Bayesian inference with JASP for studies 
of moral education with screenshots demonstrating how to set JASP options to perform various 
types of Bayesian analyses.  
Method 
Materials 
In order to compare outcomes from statistical analyses based on the frequentist and 
Bayesian perspective, we reanalyzed two datasets pertaining to moral development and moral 
education collected by two previous studies.  
The first reanalyzed dataset contained data collected from the previous studies that 
compared motivational effects of the stories of peer moral exemplars and historic figures among 
111 Korean eighth graders. The original findings, which resulted from classical statistical 
analyses, were reported in Study 2 in Han, Kim, Jeong and Cohen (2017). In this study, the 
students participated in two different types of moral educational intervention activities for eight 
weeks. On the one hand, the peer exemplar group was asked to discuss and praise moral virtues 
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and behaviors of their peer moral exemplars, such as family members and friends. On the other 
hand, the historic figure group discussed and praises moral virtue and actions of historic moral 
exemplars, such as Mother Teresa and Martin Luther King, Jr. The intervention session was 
conducted once a week for an hour. Before the beginning of the intervention period, Han et al. 
(2017) surveyed the students’ initial engagement in voluntary service activities. The same 
variable was surveyed once again twelve weeks after the pre-test survey period. Han et al. (2017) 
reported that the post-test service engagement in the peer exemplar group was greater than that in 
the historic figure group after controlling for the pre-test service engagement.    
The second dataset was collected from national norming sample of 32,229 college 
students who completed the Defining Issues Test-2 during the 2010-2015 timeframe (DIT-2; 
Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999; Center for the Study of Ethical Development). The 
DIT-2 consists of 5 dilemmas; each followed by 12 items. Participants are first asked to take the 
role of the protagonist in the story and decide what he/she ought to do, and are then asked to rate 
and rank the items in terms of their importance in interpreting the moral dilemma. Traditionally, 
the summary score of the DIT has been the "P" score, which is interpreted as the relative 
importance given to post-conventional (i.e., Kohlberg’s Stages 5 and 6) moral considerations.  
The newer N2-score used in this study is an improvement over the P-score as an overall estimate 
of moral judgment development (Thoma, 2006). More recently, the construct measured by the 
DIT has been reinterpreted (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999a, 1999b). Based upon large-
sample analyses, it appears that the DIT measures three developmentally ordered schema:  
personal interest (incorporating aspects of Kohlberg’s stages two and three), maintaining norms 
(closely aligned with Kohlberg’s stage 4) and post-conventional schema (the traditional P score 
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mentioned above). The validity and reliability of the DIT is fully discussed in Rest, Narvaez, 
Bebeau, et al. (1999b; see also Thoma, Bebeau, Dong, Liu, & Jiang, 2011).   
Procedures 
We reanalyzed the two datasets collected by the previous moral educational studies with 
JASP. First, we conducted both classical and Bayesian t-tests, ANCOVA, and correlation 
analysis with the moral exemplar intervention data. In the case of the t-tests, we compared the 
changes in voluntary service engagement (post-test – pre-test) between the peer moral exemplar 
and historic figure groups. For readers’ practical guidelines, we demonstrate how to set JASP 
options to perform Bayesian t-test and ANCOVA in screenshots (see Figure 1). the case of the 
ANCOVA, we set the change in voluntary service engagement as a dependent variable, the 
group assignment as a fixed factor, and the pre-test engagement as a covariate. While performing 
the Bayesian ANCOVA, we examined which model was the best model among possible models 
by comparing BFs. We used default values pre-set by JASP for priors and other parameters. For 
these analyses, we intended to see whether the peer exemplar group better increased service 
engagement compared with the historic moral exemplar group. 
Second, we performed both classical and Bayesian ANCOVA and correlation analyses 
with the DIT-2 dataset. For the ANCOVA, we set the N2-score as a dependent variable, and sex 
and grade level as fixed factors. In this process, the interaction effect between sex and grade 
level was also examined. For the correlation analyses, we examined correlation among the P-
score (to explore association with N2-score), N2-score, age, and grade level. Again, to provide 
readers with practical guidelines, we present how to use JASP to perform Bayesian correlation 
analysis and ANCOVA in screenshots (see Figure 2).  Similar to the Bayesian analyses of the 
moral educational intervention data, we used the default setting provided by JASP. We also 
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examined which model was the best model by comparing calculated BFs. By performing these 
analyses, we would like to test whether the aforementioned demographical factors, sex, age, and 
grade level, were associated with P- and N2-scores. Previous research has shown that there are 
significant associations among P- and N2-scores, age and grade level in college by conducting 
classical ANOVA and correlation analysis (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, et al., 1999). In addition, 
there have been debates about whether any gender biases, particularly those that are likely to 
penalize women, are embedded in the DIT and Kohlbergian perspective (Gilligan, 1982; Thoma, 
1986). However, they have not utilized Bayesian techniques, so we intended to test the 
aforementioned matters with Bayesian techniques to examine how they performed compared 
with frequentist techniques. 
In the cases of classical analyses, we used P-values as indicators for significance (i.e., p 
< .05, p < .01, and p < .001). In the cases of Bayesian analyses, we examined BFs, more 
specifically the natural logarithm values of BF, logBF, as indicators for the strength of evidence 
supporting H1 instead of H0. Following the guidelines recommended by Kass and Raftery (1995), 
we used 2logBF = 2 for the threshold of positive evidence, 2logBF = 6 for the threshold of strong 
evidence, and 2logBF = 10 for the threshold of very strong evidence. 
Results 
First, we reanalyzed the moral educational intervention dataset with JASP. When we 
performed a classical t-test, the result reported that the increase in voluntary service activity 
engagement was greater in the peer exemplar group than that in the historic figure group, t (103) 
= -2.66, p < .01, D = -.52. However, unlike the result of the classical t-test with p < .01, the result 
from the Bayesian t-test indicated that there was only weakly positive evidence supporting H1 
instead of H0, BF10 = 4.61, 2logBF = 3.06 (see Figure 1 for the prior and posterior distribution). 
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Moreover, the result from classical ANCOVA indicated that both the group assignment, F (1, 
102) = 8.58, p < .01, and pre-test service engagement, F (1, 102) = 2.15, p < .01, influenced the 
change in service engagement. Bayesian model comparison reported that the model with both 
main effects of group assignment and pre-test engagement was the best model (see Table 2). The 
result indicated that there was strong evidence to select the best model instead of the null model. 
However, unlike the result from classical ANCOVA, the result from Bayesian ANCOVA with 
the best model showed that evidence supporting the presence of the effect of group assignment 
was positive but not strong, while that supporting the presence of the effect of pre-test 
engagement was stronger, (see Table 3). 
<Place Figure 1, and Tables 2 and 3 about here> 
Second, we performed classical and Bayesian ANCOVA and correlational analysis of the 
DIT-2 dataset. Although both main effects of sex, F (1, 32,221) = 269.06, p < .001, and grade 
level were significant, F (3, 32,221) = 50.13, p < .001, the interaction effect between these two 
main effects was marginal according to the result from classical ANCOVA, F (3, 32,221) = 2.15, 
p = .09. Bayesian model comparison reported that the model only with both main effects was the 
best model; instead, the model including the interaction effect was considered less favorable than 
the best model (see Table 5). The result of Bayesian ANCOVA was consistent with the results of 
the classical ANCOVA and Bayesian model comparison. There was very strong evidence 
supporting the inclusion of the main effects of sex and grade level to the analysis model; 
however, findings suggested we exclude the interaction effect between the two main effect from 
the model (see Table 6). The results of classical and Bayesian correlation analyses are presented 
in Table 7. All correlation coefficients were found to be significant from the classical correlation 
analysis. Similarly, all calculated 2logBF values exceeded the threshold of very strong evidence 
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(2logBF = 10). However, we were able to discover that indicated strengths of evidence were very 
diverse across different associations (e.g., 2logBF = 13.94 in the case of N2-score and age vs. 
2logBF = ∞ in the case of P-score and N2-score). The results suggested that first, both grade 
level and sex significantly predicted a P-score; grade level and being a woman was positively 
associated with the score. Second, grade level was positively associated with both P- and N2-
scores, but age was negatively associated with the scores; however, the strength of evidence 
supporting the presence of association was weaker in the case of age compared with grade level.   
<Place Tables 5, 6, and 7 about here> 
Discussions 
In the present study, we compared outcomes from classical and Bayesian statistical 
analyses of datasets originally collected by two previous studies of moral education with JASP. 
The analyses of the moral educational intervention dataset demonstrated that although findings 
from classical analyses indicated the significance of both factors, group assignment and pre-test 
engagement, at p < .05 or even at p < .01, Bayesian analyses reported weakly positive evidence 
supporting H1 instead of H0. Findings from the analyses of the DIT-2 dataset corroborates such a 
point. The results from the correlation analyses showed that although classical analysis indicated 
all associations as very significant (p < .001), the result of Bayesian analysis can show us how 
the strength of evidence supporting each association was different across different associations 
with BFs (from 2logBF = 13.94 to ∞). Moreover, the Bayesian ANCOVA provided us with 
more information regarding which model should be employed by comparing BF values from 
different models.  
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In the case of the reanalysis of the moral educational intervention dataset, we found a 
divergence between the outcomes from classical and Bayesian analysis. In this situation, 
practically, both divergent outcomes, including the unfavorable outcome from Bayesian analysis, 
might need to be reported when Bayesian techniques are applied. Researchers may consider 
reporting something like the following: “Although the result from classical inference indicated 
that effect of the factor was significant (p < .05), Bayesian inference showed that the supporting 
evidence is rather weak (2 ≤ 2logBF < 6) (see Kass and Raftery (1995) for criteria). Thus, we 
need to interpret the effect of the factor with a caution.” Of course, some may argue that we can 
still criticize the weak outcome from the reanalysis based on the contemporary frequentist 
perspective. The reanalyzed study was a study to design and test interventions in a classroom 
scale, so it recruited a small number of participants. Thus, such a situation might lead to a 
relatively large effect size with a small sample size, and we might not be able to accept the 
original conclusion (p < .05 and p < .01) very confidently (Begg, 1994).  
Although we may be able to criticize the original findings from the contemporary 
frequentist perspective, Bayesian perspective can make their interpretation more 
straightforwardly; such a point will provide practical benefits to educators and researchers. Even 
if we can address issues related to p-values by reporting effect sizes and other additional 
statistical indicators, because a p-value has been regarded as an indicator that can be interpreted 
very simply (p < .05), non-experts might still be attracted by such a point (Cohen, 1994). We will 
need to interpret multiple indicators (e.g., effect sizes, sample sizes, etc.), which might seem to 
be less straightforward to interpret among non-experts compared with p-values, to make a better 
judgment from the frequentist perspective. In addition, we still cannot have any direct 
information about whether the collected data supports our hypotheses with the reported 
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frequentist indicators; such indicators inform us whether it is possible to reject null hypotheses 
(Kruschke & Liddell, 2018). If we utilize Bayesian techniques, we simple need to interpret one 
indicator, a Bayes factor, based on the suggested threshold values (e.g., Kass & Raftery, 1995). 
Also, it allows us to directly evaluate whether evidence supports our hypothesis instead of null 
hypotheses.  
In the case of the second reanalysis, the reanalysis of DIT-2 data, we found significant 
associations among P- and N2-scores, and demographic factors, sex, age, and grade level. 
Although the results from frequentist analyses unequivocally reported very significant p-values, 
p < .001, Bayesian analyses reported varying degrees of the strength of evidence supporting 
different associations as shown by Bayes factors, 2logBF, ranging from 14 to higher than 100. 
Although we could not find any explicit contradicts between results from frequentist and 
Bayesian analyses unlike the case of the first reanalysis, Bayesian analysis was better in 
differentiating the strength of the significant or supportiveness of evidence compared with 
frequentist analysis. Such a point will provide educators and researchers, future users of 
Bayesian techniques, with practical benefits related to the interpretation of outcomes.  
However, there were several points that should be interpreted with caution from the 
second reanalysis. First, although P- and N2-scores, and age and grade level showed very strong 
association between each other, it is not surprising at all to see such results. Because the N2 
index takes into account whether participants prefer post-conventional scheme, which is 
naturally related to the P index, the correlation between P- and N2-scores are supposed to be 
inflated. Second, we analyzed P- and N2-scores instead of raw scores, which has been analyzed 
by Walker et al. (2001). Walker et al. (2001) argued that Bayesian techniques allow us to directly 
analyze the stage-type raw scores instead of summarized P- and N2-scores, so they are more 
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powerful tools for longitudinal analysis that is involved the statistical tests of transitions. 
Although we also acknowledge such a point, the strength of Bayesian analysis in sophisticated 
longitudinal analysis, we decided to perform t-tests, ANOVA, and correlation analysis with 
JASP, because we intended to show how such statistical tests that have been most frequently 
utilized by educators and researchers in studies of moral education, who might not have 
sufficient statistical knowledge and computer programing skills, can be feasible performed with 
Bayesian techniques. We did such tasks by showing screenshots from JASP with brief 
explanations (screenshots) about how to operate the program, and concrete analysis results. 
Given these, Bayesian methods will contribute to better analyses in the field of moral 
education, which should be founded firmly on scientific evidence. More specifically, we may 
consider several fundamental practical benefits of Bayesian methods studies of moral education.  
First, as pointed out earlier, employing Bayesian analysis allows for more 
epistemologically straightforward interpretations of statistical evidence in the form of Bayes 
Factors. This situation is in sharp contrast to the case of frequentist hypothesis testing, which is 
largely dependent upon the use of P-values that are neither directly relevant to the researchers’ 
purposes nor make theoretical sense. Bayes Factors, in contrast, lets us to unambiguously 
quantify how much the data supports the null or the alternative more than the other, which we 
argue would be highly helpful for researchers by preventing potential misunderstandings.  
Second, Bayesian analysis lets us to incorporate prior information that are relevant to the 
research question into the statistical analysis. This can be done via constructing a prior 
distribution for quantities of interest. Bayesian analysis is the process of updating prior 
distribution, our beliefs about the parameters of interest or the null/alternative hypothesis before 
seeing the data, to posterior distribution, updated beliefs about them after observing the data. 
RUNNING HEAD: UTILIZING BAYESIAN STATISTICS 21 
Constructing prior distributions is not trivial because it requires careful examination of the 
research problem itself and available information at hand. However, when appropriately done, 
the process can facilitate better statistical inferences. For example, previous research could 
inform us about what the effect size of interest is likely to be. Researchers could use this 
information to construct a prior distribution about the effect size. Results from Bayesian analysis 
are compromises between information from the prior and the data; imposing strong priors on the 
parameters makes the result closer to the prior beliefs. Sometimes the restriction prior 
information provides is more obvious. If a researcher were to use a 7-point Likert scale to 
measure the dependent variable, she already knows that the mean difference between the 
treatment and control groups cannot exceed 7. This information could also be taken into account 
in the form of prior on the mean difference to prevent it from being greater than 7. 
Third, as shown in the present paper, Bayes Factors have built-in protective mechanisms 
which favors simpler models (hypotheses). This, we argue, is a very important but largely 
unnoticed advantage of using Bayes Factors instead of P-values. As scientists, we would 
naturally prefer simpler explanations about the phenomena of interest than more complex ones. 
This is known as ‘Occam’s razor,’ and is regarded as one of the gold standards in evaluating 
scientific theories (Myung, Balasubramanian, & Pitt, 2000). P-values fail in this regard 
miserably because they do not ‘penalize’ complex models such as H1: θ ≠ 0 sufficiently, thereby 
leading researchers to choose overly complex models over simpler ones such as H0: θ = 0, with 
sufficiently large sample sizes. This is not a result that researchers would like to see. Bayes 
Factors, instead, are a tool for hypothesis testing which takes into account the relative 
complexities of competing hypotheses (models), at least implicitly (Myung & Pitt, 1997). As we 
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saw earlier, as sample size grows, the same t-value yields increasingly large support for the null, 
not the alternative. We have also seen that results that are believed to strongly support the 
alternative (e.g., the effect of the group assignment with p = .004 in Table 2) do not hold true 
when re-analyzed in the Bayesian fashion using JASP (e.g., the effect of the group assignment 
with 2logBF = 3.05, which only suggests presence of positive but not strong evidence supporting 
an alternative hypothesis, in Table 4). They are, we believe, not coincidences but the instances 
where the tendency of Bayes Factors to favor simpler models is in action. 
A newly developed tool for Bayesian analyses, JASP, would be useful for researchers 
and educators in the field of moral education (Wagenmakers, Love, et al., 2017). Because it 
supports both classical and Bayesian analyses with a simple user interface, even end users who 
are not fluent in advanced statistics and programming, which have been used to be required for 
the implementation of Bayesian methods, will be able to perform Bayesian analyses and compare 
their outcomes with those from classical analyses conveniently. Moreover, thanks to the 
development of computational technology and resources so far, Bayesian inference that requires 
numerous iterative calculations and long time to perform in the past now can be performed with 
a personal computer easily (Gronau, Wagenmakers, Heck, & Matzke, 2017). 
Here is one practical guideline for future research in moral education using JASP: 
reporting resultant BFs on top of or instead of P-values. From the perspective of frequentists, P-
values only provide information pertaining to whether a null hypothesis about the extremity of an 
observed distribution can be rejected; they do not say anything about whether and how strongly 
evidence found from a specific study supports a hypothesis (Wagenmakers, Marsman, et al., 
2017). Furthermore, as the current debates indicated, conventional P-value thresholds widely 
used in the field, particularly, p < .05, could only support very week or even could not support 
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the presence of positive evidence (Benjamin et al., 2018). Instead, BFs show us the strength of 
evidence; directly BF thresholds used in the field can also be considered as better thresholds to 
make practical decisions about accepting a specific hypothesis based on evidence (Kass & 
Raftery, 1995). Hence, reporting BFs will provide readers, particularly researchers and educators 
who are interested in developing evidence-based moral educational programs, potentially with 
more practical information regarding whether findings, suggestions, and arguments in a specific 
article are well supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, we believe that employing 
aforementioned guidelines will significantly contribute to the improvement of statistical 
rigorousness of empirical studies of moral education as well as empirical articles in the JME.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
P(H0|D) for Jeffreys-Type prior from Berger & Sellke (1987). 
 
  n 
  1 5 10 20 50 100 1,000 
P-value t statistic        
.10 1.645 .42 .44 .47 .56 .65 .72 .89 
.05 1.960 .35 .33 .37 .42 .52 .60 .82 
.01 2.576 .21 .13 .14 .16 .22 .27 .53 
.001 3.291 .086 .026 .024 .026 .034 .045 .124 
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Table 2 
Bayesian model comparison with the moral educational intervention dataset 
Models  P(M)  P(M|data)  BF M  2logBF M BF 10  2logBF10 error %  
Null model  .25  .013  .041  -6.39 1.000  .00  
 
With group assignment .25  .062  .197  -3.25 4.610  3.06  5.701e -6  
With pre-test engagement .25  .097  .321  -2.27 7.243  3.96  .001  
With both factors  .25  .828  14.473  5.34 62.009  8.25  .685  
Note. P(M): prior model probability. P(M|data): posterior model probability. BFM: BF comparing 
that model against all the other models. BF10: BF comparing that model against the null model. 
error %:  Size of numerical error associated with the Bayes factor. 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Effects – Change in voluntary service activity in the moral educational intervention 
dataset 
Effects  P(incl)  P(incl|data)  BF Inclusion  2logBF Inclusion 
Group .500  .890  4.599  3.05 
Pre-test engagement .500  .925  7.511  4.03 
Note. P(incl): prior factor inclusion probability. P(incl|data): posterior factor inclusion 
probability. BFInclusion: BF of including a specific factor instead of not including the factor. 
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Table 5 
Bayesian model comparison with the DIT-2 dataset 
Models P(M) P(M|data) BF M  2logBF M  BF 10  2logBF 10  error % 
Null model 0.20 1.90e-94 7.61e-94 -428.83 1.00 .00 
 
With sex 0.20 2.04e-28 8.14e-28 -124.75 1.07e+66 304.08 3.53e-69 
With grade level 0.20 2.56e-64 1.03e-63 -290.08 1.35e+30 138.75 .008 
With both main effects 0.20 1.00 2725.08 15.82 5.25e+93 431.60 2.004 
With the interaction effect 0.20 .001 .006 -10.28 7.71e+90 418.55 1.742 
Note. P(M): prior model probability. P(M|data): posterior model probability. BFM: BF comparing 
that model against all the other models. BF10: BF comparing that model against the null model. 
error %:  Size of numerical error associated with the Bayes factor. 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Effects – DIT-2 dataset N2-score 
Effects P(incl) P(incl|data) BF Inclusion  2logBF Inclusion  
Sex .40 1.00 3.90e+63 292.85 
Grade level .40 1.00 4.91e+27 127.52 
Interaction effect .20 .001 .001 -13.05 
Note. P(incl): prior factor inclusion probability. P(incl|data): posterior factor inclusion 
probability. BFInclusion: BF of including a specific factor instead of not including the factor. 
  
RUNNING HEAD: UTILIZING BAYESIAN STATISTICS 35 
Table 7 
Results from classical and Bayesian correlation analyses 
    P-score N2-score Age 
N2-score Pearson's r .900 
  
 
P-value .001*** 
  
 
BF10 ∞ 
  
 
2logBF10 ∞ 
  Age Pearson's r -.029 -.027
 
 
P-value .001*** .001*** 
 
 
BF10 3,700.000 1,065.000 
 
 
2logBF10 16.432 13.941 
 Grade level Pearson's r .049 .069 .443
 
P-value .001*** .001*** .001*** 
 
BF10 2.204e+14 7.711e+30 ∞ 
  2logBF10 66.053 142.240 ∞ 
Note. BF10: BF of presence of significant correlation. *** p < .001. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Performing Bayesian t-test and ANCOVA with JASP. Users can simply select 
dependent and independent variables from the option panel (left). Once dependent and 
independent variables are set, JASP automatically reports outputs on the output screen (right). 
JASP’s user interface is identical to that of SPSS.  
Figure 2. Performing Bayesian correlation analysis with JASP. 
Figure 3. Prior and posterior distribution of the Bayesian t-test of the moral educational 
intervention dataset. 
 
                                                
i These were items found by using a keyword “Bayesian” from the JME: Derryberry and 
Thoma (2005), Heng, Blau, Fulmer, Bi, and Pereira (2017), Lee, Padilla-Walker, and Nelson 
(2015), and McGrath and Walker (2016).  
ii This article demonstrates the result of Bayesian path analysis examining how 
motivational climate, basic psychological need, and moral disengagement influence antisocial 
and prosocial behavior in sport (Hodge & Gucciardi, 2015). 
iii First, Kondo (1990) simulated the Bayesian Prisoner Dilemma game to model rational 
behavior, normative behavior, moral behavior, and cooperation. Second, Walker, Gustafson, and 
Hennig (2001) analyzed the consolidation and transition model in the development of moral 
reasoning measured by the Moral Judgment Interview with Bayesian techniques. Third, Walker, 
Gustafson, and Frimer (2007) overviewed benefits of Bayesian analysis and how to apply it in 
developmental psychology to address several methodological issues. Fourth, Railton's article 
(2017) discussed how moral learning occurs based on Bayesian perspective. 
iv This tool can be downloaded for free from https://jasp-stats.org/.  
